Hello Scott,
For simplicity’s sake, may I refer to your position as the Sanctity of Life Ethic (SLE for short)? I’ll use that title in this counter-rebuttal and replace it with a title that you prefer if necessary. You may refer to my position as the Quality of Life Ethic (QLE), if you’d like. I will first critique your opening position and then move on to your first rebuttal.
Your opening position was a very interesting read. Contained within it, I found implicit support for the idea of degrees of personhood within the human species, but I’ll get to that later. As with many ethical debates, terminology discussions become unavoidable. While I agree that we should not attempt to control the language, it is important to clearly define some of the important terms. The central term to the SLE is ‘human’. Most who adhere to the pro-life position define human as any living organism with complete human DNA. Under that definition a human begins to exist at the moment of conception. I actually agree with the pro-life’s definition of ‘human’. What I disagree with is that all humans have the same intrinsic value and the same rights. It is for this reason that I prefer the term ‘person’, as I have defined it, to ‘human’. The use of the term ‘person’ also avoids the anthropomorphic arrogance that you mentioned; it admits to the possibility of the existence of people who are not human.
Your opening position suggests that you agree that conception is not the appropriate place to draw the line: “I won’t argue that a blastocyst should necessarily have the same rights that...a baby at...twenty weeks should have.” My question for you is what criteria would you suggest we use to determine when a fetus earns a right to life? Based on your statement, “we are the most like God than any other creature. That lends a great deal of value to all human lives”, the criteria seems to involve how ‘God-like’ a being is. When you say that humans are ‘created in the image and likeness of God’, you seem to mean that we are like God in the sense that we can think, reflect on those thoughts, and morally judge our own and others’ actions. If it is in this sense that we are God-like, than ‘God-likeness’ is very similar to my definition of ‘personhood’. Also, it is clear that not all individuals are like God to the same degree. It would be ridiculous to claim that God is as much like a brain-dead individual as God is like you or me. Furthermore, under any reasonable and non-physical explanation of how we are like God will admit that there are degrees of God-likeness or personhood within our species.
Your first rebuttal was well written and brought up some very interesting and important points. To start, let me remind you that personhood is not my ‘sole measuring stick’ for moral consideration. It is only a modifier within my QLE framework; the ability to suffer plays a primary role. My main point was that one’s degree of personhood often affects one’s ability to suffer, which is why it needs to be taken into account. Thus only differences in personhood that effect suffering are important in drawing ethical distinctions.
Considering this clarification, your objection based on the reduced personhood of people with lower IQ or physically disabled is addressed. The differences between a physically normal person and a quadriplegic person have no impact on their ability to suffer. Therefore, they both are entitled to the same moral consideration. The same is true for IQ differences. Unless someone’s IQ is severely impaired, the person’s ability to suffer is not affected.
Another object to the QLE that you present is that our culture values saving the lives of children and elderly over saving the lives of able bodied adults. This seems to suggest that we intuitively value the lives of those will less personhood than those with more. I would argue that what we really value is the person’s willingness to save those unable to save themselves. What we are doing as a culture is relying on intuition that approximates a complex moral calculation. On average, those with high degrees of personhood are more likely to be able to save themselves. Thus we reserve greater praise for someone who doesn’t waste effort saving an individual with a high chance of survival and instead spends that effort saving someone with a lower chance. The net effect on a grand scale is that more people survive.
Another of your objections has some validity. A reason that we might value the life of a child over the life of an adult is because the potential personhood a child possesses. This is the argument from potentiality. This argument states that a fetus has the potential to become a full person, thus a fetus/unborn child should have the same rights as a person. The problem with this line of reasoning is that it can be used to justify giving fewer rights to beings as well as more. I have the potential to become a corpse, yet no one (I hope) would claim that I should have the same rights as a corpse! Clearly one’s potential cannot be the only criteria on which we grant moral worth.
Despite this problem, I think that potential personhood must play some role in the calculus of the QLE. On this, we agree. The problem is determining what role. Any inclusion of potential must be modified by the probability of achieving that potential. For this reason, I would agree that a blastocyst shouldn’t receive the same moral consideration as a third trimester fetus/unborn child since the blastocyst has much lower of a chance of realizing its potential personhood. As a result, actual personhood should receive more consideration than potential personhood. Thus even with taking potentiality into account, a mother’s suffering carries more moral weight than that of her fetus/unborn child.
Does motivation play into my thoughts? The simple answer is yes. It matters in its relation to suffering, of course. I’ll give an example in relation to abortion. Consider two expecting women. Woman A suffers from minor but chronic back pain while pregnant. Woman B suffers from brittle bone disease. Carrying a child to term would be extraordinarily painful and would likely cripple her permanently. These two women would have very different motivations for having an abortion. Clearly having an abortion would reduce the suffering of woman B far more than it would for woman A. Therefore, woman B has far more moral justification for an abortion than woman A. Is it morally permissible for mother A to have an abortion? Well that leads to your other question...
At what point does the life of a fetus/unborn child gain its own importance? Well, the moment it can suffer. The real question is at what point does the fetus/unborn child’s potential personhood carry as much weight as the mother’s suffering? It depends on the level of suffering. I think that the mother is best able to answer the question. She is best able to determine her own level of suffering and thus has the most information to perform the moral calculus.
I eagerly await your response.