Debate

I would like to start by stating that I find this issue to be ambiguous, morally speaking. I recognize that both sides of the issue have legitimate points that deserve careful consideration. Scott and I have agreed to start with debating the morality of abortion first and not to discuss the legality of the issue until later. We will both write a short essay (this being mine) defining our respective positions and then enter into an on-going debate via the forum.

When it comes to actions, I have four categories of morality: morally neutral, morally wrong, morally permissible, and morally right. Morally neutral actions are those that are irrelevant of moral consideration; e.g. deciding what color shirt to wear today. Morally wrong actions are those which are wrong in all or most circumstances, e.g; murdering a person. Morally permissible acts are those where the morality of the act heavily depends on the circumstances. Lying is one such act. Lying in an attempt to get an internet user’s username and password to a bank account is wrong, lying when asked if you like your coworker’s new shoes is neutral, and lying to protect the identity of a witness to a gang murder is good. Lastly, morally right actions are those which involve some form of self-sacrifice for the betterment of others. Volunteering at a homeless shelter is an example.

My position is that having an abortion is a morally permissible act. It falls into that morally ambiguous zone where circumstances weigh heavily on the judgment of the action. In order to defend this position, I must describe the underlying moral reasoning that led me to this conclusion. This will be a roundabout journey, but I will eventually apply the following reasoning to the abortion issue. I believe that a utilitarian theory of morality, similar to that of Peter Singer’s, is the best approximation we have to moral truth. Under this theory, the moral value of an action is based on the amount of suffering that results or is alleviated from that action. Furthermore, the amount of suffering is weighted by the level of personhood those effected possess.

It is on the topic of personhood that I expect much of the debate to take place. The reason is because it is likely the dividing line between my world view and that of religious people. For this reason, I should define ‘personhood’ carefully. Personhood is the extent to which a being is able to sense the world, react to it, think, and reflect on their actions. Under this definition, a rock has no personhood, a plant has very little personhood, and most human adults have a very high degree of personhood.

How does the degree of personhood relate to suffering? Well consider cutting off a part of a creature and consider how it affects objects of varying personhood. Clearly, cutting off a piece of a rock causes no suffering. Also, though cutting off a limb of a tree causes the tree to ‘suffer’ in the sense that it is less able to feed itself through photosynthesis, there is absolutely no awareness of this loss. Similarly, pulling off a leg of a beetle probably causes some pain, but there is likely no real awareness of that pain and certainly no on-going suffering for the beetle. Next consider cutting off a limb of a cat. Certainly, the cat suffers both from the pain of the removal and the on-going pain of not being able to do all those behaviors cats love to do. The cat’s higher level of personhood increases its suffering. Compare this, now, to the suffering of a fully grown and fully capable human that loses a leg. The pain of suffering the wound may be comparable to that of the cats, but the suffering is intensified by the human’s high level of personhood. A person would be all too aware of the implications of loosing that limb. The person would know that he or she are now limited in his or her choice of occupations, hobbies, and even modes of socializing. The person would likely consider it more difficult to find a mate or raise children. And, perhaps worst of all, the person’s high level thinking and self-reflection is capable of imagining ‘what if’. He or she could reflect on what life could have been like, if he or she had never lost that limb. Self-reflection makes some self-pity almost inevitable, even if temporary. In this sense, personhood amplifies suffering.

Also, differing degrees of personhood exist within one species, specifically, ours. Here is where my morality runs smack into divine command theorists. Most religious people consider all humans to have identical inherent value regardless of their developmental status. This is sometimes referred to as the ‘sanctity of (human) life’ position. In contrast, the ‘degree of personhood’ utilitarianism admits that not all humans have the same level of personhood and are thus capable of differing degrees of suffering. Consider someone in a persistent vegetative state. How does this individual stack up against the definition of personhood? Sadly, not very well. The individual might be able to sense the world around him/her to a limited extent, but that individual’s ability to interact with the world is severely curtailed. And to the best of our knowledge, such an individual is incapable of any meaningful thought and self-reflection. We can see the individual’s diminished state of personhood illustrated by his/her diminished ability to suffer. Consider if a terrible accident severed this individual’s leg. Sure, he/she might feel the pain but would not have the additional suffering of reflecting on the life-changing implications of the loss.

So how does all this apply to the abortion issue? Well, as with any action, under this moral theory, one must consider the amount of suffering caused by taking that action. Also, when performing this moral calculus, the suffering of each individual must be modified by the individuals’ level of personhood. With an abortion decision, the two most impacted entities are the mother and the fetus. Clearly, the level of personhood is much higher in the mother than in the fetus. Thus the suffering of the mother takes on much more importance when evaluating the morality of an abortion. Even if a fetus is capable of feeling pain, it certainly cannot fathom the implications of the abortion. On the contrary, the mother is fully aware of the likely results of her decision. It is the amplifying effect of personhood on suffering that permits the mother’s interests to trump those of the fetus.

As I wrote towards the top, this moral theory is not perfect, only a good approximation. I am fully aware of some of the problems with this type of utilitarianism, some of which I’m sure we will discuss. It does seem like a good place for me to start the discussion. Lastly, it has been a very long time since I’ve rigorously described these ethics. I wrote this entire essay from memory without any research. I politely ask to reserve the right to modify this theory as I research during the course of the debate. I eagerly await Scott’s response.