I’ve finally taken the time to respond. I apologize for the wait.

Basically, you’ve defined ‘God-likeness’ as “that which is unique to humans”, but never explain what “that” is. Since ‘God-likeness’ is at the heart of your SLE, it is necessary to give a clear definition of what it is and how we can recognize it.

You do mention some expressions of that difference such as philosophy, art, and science. But, as you admit, people have differing abilities to express these qualities and differing potentials to express these qualities. Furthermore, some humans have no ability nor potential to express these qualities. With no other way to measure ‘God-likeness’, we must conclude that people have differing degrees of whatever it is that enables people to do philosophy, art, etc. If these abilities are not sufficient to gauge one’s ‘God-likeness’, what is sufficient? The SLE fails to give any measure which doesn’t vary to meaningful degrees within our species.

In contrast, I have laid out a clear definition of what personhood is: “the extent to which a being is able to sense the world, react to it, think, and reflect on their actions.” Varying degrees of personhood easily explains the differences in the ability to express philosophy, art, etc. It also admits to differing degrees of personhood, hence differing capacities for suffering and thus differing moral considerations.

You seem to be under the mistaken impression that my version of the QLE states that one’s level of personhood influences their right to live. One the contrary, every living thing has an interest in living and thus should have some right to live. All personhood does is affect one’s capacity for suffering. Suffering is the common denominator for moral consideration and occurs when a being is unable to pursue its interests. When interests are in conflict, as they are in many circumstances, the most moral action is the one that minimizes suffering across all entities involved.

There is one section of your most recent response that I object to strongly. “I rebut that this woman isn't guaranteed by anything I'm aware of to avoid certain expenses, inconveniences, hardships, etc.” Surely, you are not saying the woman can be forced to experience avoidable expenses, inconveniences, hardships, etc? She does have moral and legal guarantees that she can’t be forced to experience such things when they are avoidable. Otherwise we may mug this woman with impunity since she has no moral guarantees of escaping expenses, hardships, etc. What moral law do I use to ascribe her those rights? Why the QLE, of course. Experiencing those things causes suffering, which is the unit of moral consideration.

Finally, allow me to answer the question, “…given our current level of technology and ability to keep a child alive starting some time in the late second trimester that performing a C-section and letting the child have a shot to live would be morally superior to having an abortion since it actually has the same affect of removing the baby from the mother's womb and keeps the baby from losing that one thing it has?”

My answer may surprise you. If any woman chooses to carry a fetus to term, it is morally superior if she does so, even if she incurred the expense. Why? Since the woman chooses to carry a fetus to term, she is stating her interests. Having an abortion would deny her pursuit of her interest and thus cause additional suffering. The question really is, “is it morally superior to force a woman to undergo a c-section when the fetus is viable outside the womb?” My answer is no, even when the woman is spared the financial burden. There is still the suffering that would result from anxiety over the risks of the operation, the pain of the surgery itself, and the scaring that would result.