In order to not appear as weird as last time...

The more accepted name for what most closely resembles what I believe is Molinism.

Granted, middle knowledge is a tricky thing (I don't like it) but it deals with the possibilities of things without going into multiple worlds.

Hello Scott:

"Here's my question to Bob (and you). Prior to our salvation, do we have "divine dignity" to be robbed of?"

I bet you could guess my answer }:>

Hello Bob:

"Believing in Jesus sets us free to be fully human and fully alive"

So nonbelievers are neither fully human nor fully alive, eh? The logical conclusion from such a statement is the following: nonbelievers are not subject to the same moral considerations we give to fully human and fully alive people. Such rhetoric is... deeply disturbing.

Hello pinakidion,

I don't think you were weird last time, just that the Many-Worlds Interpretation has weird consequences for the Christian concept of the soul.

Based on a cursory reading of the Wikipedia entry on Molinism (so take my response for what it's worth), I'd have to say that it doesn't rescue freewill from divine foreknowledge. Middle knowledge is no different than knowing the outcomes of all possible choices. Molinism claims that God also knows which choice one will make in a given circumstance. Thus given that circumstance, I cannot fail to chose what God knows I will chose. If I had free-choice in the situation, it must be possible for me to fail to make any given choice.

Many worlds does create some weird consequences for Christian theology. My answer for that is usually something along the lines of Jesus' admonition to Peter, "What is that to you?"

What Molinism and modal logic do specifically is deal with truth in relation to perspective. It also separates knowledge of an event from cause of the event.

Basically, I understand that you follow determinism. Here's a classical definition:

An intellect which at any given moment knew all the forces that animate Nature and the mutual positions of the beings that comprise it, if this intellect were vast enough to submit its data to analysis, could condense into a single formula the movement of the greatest bodies of the universe and that of the lightest atom: for such an intellect nothing could be uncertain; and the future just like the past would be present before our eyes

Where I would disagree is that this is not a forgone conclusion. There are areas of modern physics that concede there are exceptions.

For most things, we observe that an object is in its present state because of the values of its measurable proprieties and vice versa.

Water exists as steam because the temperature is 212F, pressure and volume remaining standard. Therefore, any water measured at 212F with standard pressure and volume is steam.

Some things in physics cannot be completely measured. Quantum particles can have their position or velocity measured, not both. The state of a quantum particle can only be described as the position and probable velocity or velocity and probable position.

How does all this relate to free will?

Calvinism would say God knows person P in circumstance C will choose option X over option Y, therefore God ordains A to choose X. A Molinist would say since agent A, when placed in circumstance C, will freely choose option X over option Y, God ordains circumstance C.

The former has God ordaining choices whereas the later has God ordaining circumstances.

But if God knows that circumstance C will inevitably lead to X (saying 'freely choose' is a redundancy, we can just say 'choose'), and chooses C for that reason, isn't he for all effective purposes taking away any real choice? Because of the circumstance, the choice is certain (X), so it seems God is still ordaining choices, just at one remove.

Hello there, pinakidion,

A Molinist would say since agent A, when placed in circumstance C, will freely choose option X over option Y, God ordains circumstance C.

This really sounds like linguistic trickery to me. The statement is completely consistent without the word 'freely'. It's almost as if it is inserted by the Molinist so (s)he can claim, "See, the choice was free. It says so right there".

It's not true freedom. To be truly a 'free' choice, agent A must be able to choose Y in circumstance C. If it is guaranteed that A will choose X given C, it is improper to describe that choice as 'free'. That guarantee is made by God's foreknowledge.

Also, building on what Snurp wrote, since God knows every choice every agent will make in every circumstance and God ordained every circumstance, the universe de facto deterministic.

Rather than a long response, have you heard of the Frankfurt counterexamples? (The wikipedia entry is quite sparse)

They address the issue of determinism.

I have not, but I will read about it when I have some extra time.

Okay, so here is an example of a Frankfurt counterexample that I found on the Stanford link in my previous comment:

Black, an evil neurosurgeon, wishes to see White dead but is unwilling to do the deed himself. Knowing that Mary Jones also despises White and will have a single good opportunity to kill him, Black inserts a mechanism into Jones's brain that enables Black to monitor and to control Jones's neurological activity. If the activity in Jones's brain suggests that she is on the verge of deciding not to kill White when the opportunity arises, Black's mechanism will intervene and cause Jones to decide to commit the murder. On the other hand, if Jones decides to murder White on her own, the mechanism will not intervene. It will merely monitor but will not affect her neurological function. Now suppose that when the occasion arises, Jones decides to kill White without any "help" from Black's mechanism. In the judgment of Frankfurt and most others, Jones is morally responsible for her act. Nonetheless, it appears that she is unable to do otherwise since if she had attempted to do so, she would have been thwarted by Black's device. (Adapted from an example by John Fischer, 1982).

The argument is that Mary used her freewill to kill White even though she had no possible alternatives. This is supposed to be a counterexample to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) that I use do defend determinism in light of divine foreknowledge. Here's my argument formally:

1. An action A is not free if one cannot choose an alternative possibility (PAP)
2. God's foreknowledge of an action A eliminates all alternative possibilities.
3. Therefor action A was not chosen freely

The example above supposedly refutes premise 1 by giving an example of an action that is freely chosen even though no alternative is available. The first problem I have with this counterexample is that it assumes freewill a priori. If the universe is truly deterministic then Mary didn't freely chose to kill White. No alternative was available to her not because of Black's device, but because of the nature of the universe.

There is also a logical problem with the counterexample. This time, let's presuppose freewill. I would argue that Mary did have an alternative possibility. She could have chosen not to kill White, even though that choice would be immediately overridden by Black's device. There were alternative possibilities with respect to Mary's choice even if there wasn't with respect to her action. Thus PAP is intact.

The third problem with this counterexample is a theological one. It suggests that God's foreknowledge actively overrides any alternative choices we make. This would imply that God overrides some people's choice not to torture, kill, etc. and even override some people's choice to accept Jesus. This would contradict the grand benevolence attributed to God by Christianity.

Sorry to be late again to the dance Scott.. especially since I only have a few minutes to respond. My thoughts revolve around the idea of mankind being without excuse. If we are totally depraved then it seems to me that we have an excuse.. God didn't want some of us so our excuse is the lack of God's invitation.

On the other hand Paul says about those not chosen:

For when Gentiles who do not have the Law do instinctively the things of the Law, these, not having the Law, are a law to themselves, in that they show the work of the Law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness and their thoughts alternately accusing or else defending them, on the day when, according to my gospel, God will judge the secrets of men through Christ Jesus. (Romans 2:14-16)

It seems, to me anyway, that God has endowed mankind with a conscience.. it also seems that He has given each the ability to respond to Him.. or not.

I'll try to come back later.

See you dogs later :)

Hey Bob! I've been meaning to get back to you.

I don't think either view leads to having an excuse. Of course even if we did God wouldn't say, "Oh shoot, it's totally my fault that you're sinful. Come on in."

So are you saying that the Romans 2 passage is saying that Gentiles aren't chosen? I think it's saying that Gentiles are without excuse, since they have the law written on their hearts they can't say "No one told me what I had to do!". We do have a conscience. And if you're saying that God gives is the ability to chose or not chose where are you getting that?

Hey Sid,

You deserve a better answer than this, so forgive my brevity. It may seem that I am overlooking your argument, but I'm not trying to do so deliberately.

I thought that the example was about freedom of choice existing. I don't see how PAP is preserved because the action is set.

Maybe a better example would be Newcomb's problem: (This is typed out for the benefit of others, Wikipedia is pretty good about this one)

A person is playing a game operated by the Predictor, who always accurately predicts people's actions. For the benefit of future discussion, it is assumed that time travel is not involved with the Predictor's knowledge.

The player of the game is presented with two boxes, labeled A and B. The player can take the contents of both boxes, or just one box. Box A contains $1,000. The contents of box B is determined by the Predictor. If the Predictor believes that a person will only choose one box, it will contain 1 million dollars. If the Predictor believes that a person will choose two boxes, it will be empty.

By the time the game begins, and the player is called upon to choose which box or boxes to take. The contents of box B have already been determined.

It the predictor's foreknowledge enough to determine the player's choice? Could it be said that the action leads to the cause?

Personally, I think it depends on the motivation of the player. Assuming the player wants to test the predictor, he/she chooses both boxes. If the player wants money, he/she chooses only Box B. If the player wants to demonstrate the freedom to be irrational, he/she chooses only Box A.

In any case, I do not see how the Predictor's knowledge of the player's choice determines the player's choice.

more later when I can.

All I am saying Scott is that if man is totally depraved (TD) then no one can respond to God on any level. It puts us all on the level of monkeys. The passage in Romans indicates that God created all of us as volitional moral (i.e. with a conscience) beings that (I think) have the ability to respond to the love of God.

I think that you and Casey already had a long interchange on this one.. I agree mostly with Casey on this one.

I don't think that all of mankind is TD.. but you can be if you want.. so how savage and deprave were you before Christ came into your life :)

I understand Bob. I really do. I've not always believed in total depravity. For me it's just been the last few years. I disagree with you on what that Romans passage is saying and that's okay too. It's a worthy discussion to have. And I appreciate your tone on it.

Question about two things. One if you don't believe that all men are totally depraved, do you believe some are and if so why are only some td? Also, fyi TD doesn't mean that everyone is just as bad as bad can be. It just means that sin has touched every part of man and has corrupted everything within us to the point that we're not able to choose God. That doesn't make us monkeys and doesn't remove our excuse. It does make us in need of a redeemer.

I think that if you're saying that there's a part of you that sin hasn't touched then that just seem to run contrary to what the Bible says. Am I misunderstanding?

Oh and I was pretty dang depraved. Still am, just not, like, totally. Thankfully God's still sanctifying me.

Hi Scott,

You and I have a similar view of depravity.. I also believe that sin has touched every part of us.. but I don't think that 51% of every part of us has been touched.

Bottom line.. I think that God has made man unique in that we are the only species that have the capability to respond to God's love in Christ.

I find the Calvinist position on this to be similar to the Christian Universalist view except that the Calvinist says that God has chose some instead of all as the CU whould say.. but I may not really understand all of the issues around this.

Thanks for the dialog.. not sure that there is much more to say? I am not a zealot on this stuff as it is so controversial.. I get worn out pretty fast :)

Happy Friday, Bob

Hello pinakidion,

Feel free to take time with your responses. I'm enjoying the debate so your comments are worth the wait.

"I thought that the example was about freedom of choice existing. I don't see how PAP is preserved because the action is set."

The example was supposed to show that freewill and having no alternative choices are compatible; a counter example to PAP. My point was that while there was no alternative with respect to the action, there was an alternative with respect to her choice. Thus PAP is preserved.

Is the predictor infallible? That makes all the difference. Divine foreknowledge is, presumable, infallible. If God were the Predictor in your example, then it would be impossible for the contestant to choose Box A or both. For if (s)he did make one of those other choices, God would have been wrong which would contradict the infallibility presumption.